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12. Harmonization of similar instruments
Rachel Slater
12.1 INTRODUCTION
We have been writing about harmonization of social protection in general, and of social 
transfers in particular, for at least two decades. Among the earliest references to the issue is 
found in Norton et al. (2001, 13) where social protection is noted to be ‘fragmented and poorly 
coordinated, making balanced judgements about priorities and the appropriate role for public 
policy difficult’. Donor agencies followed soon after with, for example, UNICEF suggesting 
in 2008 that ‘There is an urgent need to reduce fragmentation and increase harmonization in 
(national) social protection programme support and delivery’. Increasing harmonization is, in 
turn, a key step towards achieving integrated social protection systems – those that address 
social and economic vulnerabilities; provide a comprehensive set of interventions; go beyond 
risk management intervention and safety nets to address structural vulnerabilities; facilitate 
multi-sectoral coordination; coordinate with supply-side investments (e.g. delivery of basic 
services); and situate social protection within wider social and economic policies (UNICEF 
2012).
More recently, the International Labour Organization argued that ‘In many countries, social 
protection programmes… struggle with limited coverage, inadequate benefit levels, fragmen-
tation and weak institutionalization’ (2019, 11) and calls to address fragmentation were made 
at the Ministerial Forum at the United Nations Commission for Social Development’s 57th 
Session in 2019 (United Nations 2019). Social protection publications – whether they are 
strategies, policies, evaluations or research reports – are replete with these concerns about the 
fragmentation and lack of coherence of programmes and systems. Some programmes even 
include harmonization in their names (for example the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer 
Programme in Zimbabwe).
However, while the symptoms have been widely reported over many years – patchy cov-
erage, inconsistent transfer levels, limited linkages between programmes or inefficient and 
unreliable delivery – there is rather less detailed diagnosis of what the problem is and even 
fewer articulations of solutions.
This chapter seeks to address these gaps in problem diagnosis and identification of solu-
tions. It begins by providing a framework for harmonization, then unpicks the problem of 
fragmentation and explains why it arises. It then uses real-world examples from low- and 
middle-income countries to show how it can be tackled. Although when people talk about 
harmonization they tend to be discussing harmonization between social transfers and social 
insurance, and between social protection and wider programmes, or sectors and systems such 
as health, education and rural development, in this chapter the focus is narrower. Here the 
emphasis is on harmonization between individual social transfer schemes or within social 
transfer systems. There are good reasons for doing this.
First, harmonizing across a range of social transfer programmes helps to enhance coverage 
and reduce gaps. In turn, this can contribute to more inclusive social protection where spe-
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Figure 12.1 Goals of harmonization – efficiency, equity and effectiveness
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cific groups or individuals are not left out. Second, it allows us to make efficiency gains in 
programmes – for example by avoiding the duplication of administrative infrastructure and 
by integrating beneficiary information systems to identify where some households receive 
multiple benefits while others receive nothing. Third, it renders more visible the similarities 
and differences between programmes and forces policy-makers and practitioners to provide 
a consistent logic as to who gets what and why. Fourth, in turn, this can make social transfers 
more equitable – by aligning benefit levels and the logic applied to setting them.
12.2 FRAMING FRAGMENTATION AND HARMONIZATION
This section draws on concepts of effectiveness, efficiency and equity, to provide an analytical 
framing of harmonization to guide the subsequent analysis in the chapter.
‘Fragmentation’ is rarely explicitly defined but has become a catch-all term referring to 
a whole range of design, coverage, financial, targeting and information challenges in social 
protection programmes and systems. As a corollary, the term ‘harmonization’ provides 
a similar, but unsubstantiated, catch-all for the solution. A good starting point for unpacking 
harmonization is what we are seeking to achieve. In this chapter, the primary goal of harmoni-
zation is assumed to be effective social protection, that is, social protection that meets the needs 
of poor and vulnerable people.
To achieve effectiveness, two important intermediate outcomes of harmonization are effi-
ciency and equity (Figure 12.1). The distinction allows a focus on practical and technical 
actions, such as alignment of programme features, single registries or electronic payment 
systems (efficiency) and more strategic elements, such as choice of transfer modality, or which 
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people or groups are eligible to receive transfers, through which entitlements to social transfer 
coverage can be realized (equity). In the former, we are ensuring that things work well (and 
addressing the second and third reasons for harmonizing highlighted above); in the latter that 
no one is left out and different groups of people get what they specifically need (addressing 
the first and fourth reasons for harmonization). Actions to achieve efficiency and equity both 
contribute to effectiveness, but they are also mutually reinforcing. For example, savings made 
through administrative efficiency can create the fiscal space to increase coverage of groups 
hitherto left out of social transfers. In the other direction, the increases in coverage that result 
from more inclusive or universal programming create efficiencies through economies of scale 
and reduced transaction costs.
Tackling both efficiency and equity is important. While there are many explicit examples 
of attempts to improve technical and practical programming elements of social transfers by 
international agencies, lessons from the European Commission (2011) in relation to Europe 
suggest that working towards efficiency (for example by tighter targeting, reducing fraud, 
etc.) alone is not enough. ‘This… may very well alleviate, or at least mitigate, extreme poverty 
at the very bottom of the income distribution but the impact on relative poverty and income 
inequality is less straightforward’ (2011, 6).
12.3 FRAGMENTATION CHALLENGES IN SOCIAL TRANSFER 
SCHEMES
In this section, key fragmentation challenges are described. Overall, the implications of 
fragmentation are significant, particularly in terms of cost. White et al. (2013) explored the 
Government of Bangladesh’s efforts to strengthen the coordination, targeting and coverage of 
the country’s array of programmes. They found that, together, existing programmes reached 
less than a third of poor families and reduced the poverty gap by only 10 per cent, but cost 2.4 
per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) (including as much as 0.6 per cent of GDP for the 
state-funded civil service pension, not always included in the definition of social transfers). 
They concluded that for the same cost it would be possible to provide a universal child grant 
and a universal social pension, reaching 94 per cent of poor families and reducing the poverty 
gap by 35 per cent. So addressing fragmentation and having greater harmonization can free up 
resources to achieve far more with social protection. Doing so requires a more detailed look at 
the nature of fragmentation challenges across policy, institutional and administrative domains.
Key fragmentation challenges include the following:
12.3.1 Too Many Programmes
Concerns about the problem of a proliferation of many small programmes are common in the 
social protection literature. In Bangladesh, for example, programmes run into the hundreds 
bringing challenges of replication and alignment. The World Bank reported 99 government 
safety net programmes in 2013 (plus many more run by non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs)) and 140 in 2016. In 2020, the Social Security Policy Support Programme reported 
there were 118 social protection programmes, many of them social transfers, across 25 distinct 
ministries or divisions (World Bank 2013, 2016; Government of Bangladesh 2018). Having 
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multiple smaller programmes means missing out on economies of scale in targeting, registra-
tion, payments and monitoring systems and thus increasing the cost of delivery.
12.3.2 Replication and Overlaps
Replication occurs when there are multiple programmes all tackling one particular problem 
and tends to result in another equally urgent problem being ignored. Similarly, there are major 
concerns (expressed from both efficiency and equity points of view) about situations in which 
some beneficiaries receive multiple sources of support, because different programmes target 
the same people, while others qualify for no support whatsoever. There is limited evidence 
that the extent of overlapping beneficiaries warrants the level of concern (see for example 
evidence on limited overlaps of social transfers at household level in Nepal (Slater et al. 
2018)). However, there is limited data available – especially household survey data that can 
identify when households receive more than one programme. The Atlas of Social Protection 
(ASPIRE) database is rather better at measuring gaps than duplication. ASPIRE data can 
identify where households receive both social assistance (i.e. transfers) and social insurance, 
but does not yet distil how many households receive more than one social transfer programme 
because ‘Indicators do not count for overlap among program types (people receiving more 
than one program)’ (World Bank 2018, 35). Getting better evidence is important for identify-
ing overlapping coverage – especially where there are many small non-government transfer 
programmes run by NGOs and donor agencies – and is key for addressing duplication.
12.3.3 Lack of Coverage/Uneven Coverage
There are a number of ways that fragmentation results in a lack of coverage. A good example 
is related to social transfers seeking to improve food security: food transfers and education 
stipends delivered in schools predominantly focus on primary-aged children attending school 
and miss those that are under five, in secondary school or who have dropped out. This is 
despite strong evidence of both the importance of programmes in meeting nutrition needs 
during the first 1000 days of life and an increasing recognition of the importance (but chronic 
under-resourcing) of adolescents, especially girls. In many parts of the world, support for 
people with disability or who are unemployed lags behind transfers for other groups. The 
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA), drawing on the 
International Labour Organization (2018a), finds that, in Africa for example, unemployment 
cover is at 6 per cent compared to coverage of 23 per cent for older people (pensions) and 16 
per cent for children. For transfers for people with severe disability there is a paucity of data 
on Sub-Saharan Africa, with records of coverage available for only a handful of countries 
(Burkina Faso 0.1 per cent, Cameroon 0.1 per cent, Mali 0.6 per cent, Mozambique 0.6 per 
cent and South Africa 64.3 per cent), suggesting very low coverage except in South Africa 
(ILO 2019). Three elements that can explain these coverage gaps are discussed in more detail 
in the next section: global funding opportunities; political preoccupations; and administrative 
simplicity.
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12.3.4 Varying Benefit Levels
Another challenge is the situation of similar programmes paying rather different transfer 
levels – without a clear rationale or formula for doing so. In Nepal, senior citizens receive 2000 
Nepali rupees (NPR) each month, poor/vulnerable households with children under five receive 
NPR400, widows and single women NPR1000 and people with disability between NPR300 
and 2000 per month. In Kenya, variations in payment levels in the main social transfer pro-
grammes has led to substantial efforts to better align the programme benefits discussed below 
(Republic of Kenya 2017). While it is clear that different groups will have different needs, 
with the implication that some will require greater transfers than others, the range of values 
seen at present implies that setting transfer levels is frequently based less on a clear methodol-
ogy incorporating a robust assessment of need and more on what is politically palatable. This 
in turn can create further inequity where some groups are seen as more deserving than others.
12.3.5 Limited Integration of Administrative Systems
In particular, where social transfer programmes are delivered by different ministries or depart-
ments of government, there can be substantial dislocation of administrative systems. Different 
programmes may use different targeting approaches, payment pathways (mobile or e-banking 
payments versus physical cash distribution), grievance mechanisms and might hold separate 
lists of beneficiaries in each organization. This can result in both inefficiencies (for example 
the use of multiple mobile money agents at a greater unit cost) and inequities (for example 
overlaps and gaps in beneficiary coverage). For the poorest and most vulnerable households, 
these multiple systems can be both confusing and time-consuming to navigate.
12.3.6 Lack of Consideration of Operational Elements Beyond the Transfers 
Themselves
It is widely acknowledged that beyond the costs and administration of transfers themselves, 
there are many wider elements in the administration of social transfers. Some programmes are 
substantially more administration-intensive than others, for example, conditional cash transfer 
programmes that require information and monitoring systems to verify compliance with con-
ditions. Harmonizing administration systems can provide important routes to efficiency. This 
is the case within social transfers but it is also important to look beyond social transfers them-
selves to other sectors. In South Africa, UNICEF (2008, 11) note that ‘the main constraints 
to expanding the social security system relate more to delivery capacity than to budgetary 
constraints’. They argue that services linked to social transfers are fragmented, that institu-
tional coherence is lacking and there are not enough social workers, social auxiliary workers 
and community development practitioners. For example, foster care grants are provided to 
nearly half a million households each but the real financial constraint is in the funding of social 
workers organizing court orders, regular supervision and returning to court to reapply after two 
years. The challenges in South Africa are as much about harmonization beyond social transfers 
as within them, but recognizing wider administrative demands of social transfers remains 
important for harmonization within.
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12.4 WHAT CAUSES FRAGMENTATION?
Having identified key fragmentation challenges in the previous section, the focus here is on the 
drivers, structural or otherwise, of fragmentation.
12.4.1 Low Capacity in Ministries leading Social Transfer Programmes and Systems
In many countries, ministries leading on social transfers are weak and the lack of institutional 
capacity contributes to fragmentation:
Social protection is often caught in a vicious cycle – the inherent institutional weaknesses can reduce 
the programming effectiveness (leading to leakage and corruption) and promote fragmentation. This 
in turn reduces the profile, coverage, and resources for the responsible ministries and for social pro-
tection activities. Though capacity of social protection led ministries (usually ministries of gender, or 
labour and social affairs) varies immensely between regions, they consistently exhibit a low profile 
relative to other parts of Government. (UNICEF 2008, 18)
It is also common for social transfers to be implemented by a number of different ministries. 
As a result, tackling institutional capacity constraints in social transfers is a key part of the 
harmonization agenda.
12.4.2 Fragmentation as an Inherent Feature of Donor-Supported Systems in Low- 
and Middle-Income Countries
Fragmentation (and subsequent harmonization) can be interpreted as part of the natural evo-
lution of social transfer systems in situations where there is heavy international engagement. 
Limited government engagement in low-income countries and erratic funding of fledgling pro-
grammes results in short-term, projectized approaches by governments. This is compounded 
where NGOs fill the government programme vacuum with a plethora of programmes each 
with limited coverage. The need to persuade governments that social protection is affordable 
and financially sustainable leads to a proliferation of ‘proof-of-concept’ pilot programmes, 
and donor agencies tending to support actions that align with their in-house definitions and 
frameworks and their off-the-shelf instruments.
12.4.3 Fragmentation Driven by the Focus on Rapid-Onset Shocks in Low- and 
Middle-Income Countries
While in richer countries the focus of social transfer programmes is lifecycle-related shocks 
and stresses, in low- and middle-income countries programmes have often emerged in 
response to climate and environment-related shocks, such as floods and drought. In these 
situations, both the magnitude and nature of vulnerabilities can change quickly – for example, 
when conflict or a climate-related disaster triggers displacement – and existing programmes 
may prove inadequate at tackling these emerging or expanding vulnerabilities and new and 
different responses are put in place that may lack alignment with existing programmes.
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12.4.4 Political Drivers of Fragmentation
Fragmentation can also indicate underlying structural problems with the design, coordination 
and delivery of transfer programmes that are inherently political. At a national level the influ-
ence of political economy can be strong and lead to uneven or skewed coverage. Governments 
often choose the programmes that provide the path of least resistance. That might mean doing 
programmes that are technically easy, or providing support that is less controversial. In Nepal, 
for example, social transfer programmes have emerged not primarily based on comprehen-
sive analysis of vulnerabilities and needs but based on which are ‘administratively relatively 
simple to implement’ (particularly categorical-targeted programmes), populist and appropriate 
within an ‘unstable and highly competitive political environment’ (Sijapati 2017; Jones 2012, 
252). In the worst cases the political expediency leads to distinct patterns of coverage with 
some communities ignored (UN DESA 2018a). For example, Hossain (2011) finds that, for 
some social transfers, while over 97 per cent of Adivasi households in Barind, Bangladesh, 
are technically eligible, less than 3 per cent receive benefits, and argues that this results from 
a combination of lack of information about programmes and overt discrimination.
12.4.5 Fragmentation as a Side Effect of Decentralized Governance Systems
Fragmentation can be symptomatic of situations where federal, state and other programmes 
operate simultaneously. Asher and Vora (2018), for example, highlight the bewildering array 
of social protection programmes and instruments in India. They find that the federal structure, 
among other features, leads to a diffusion of responsibilities for the design, implementation 
and evaluation of the programmes between the union government and the states that poses 
‘considerable challenges for policy coherence, and organisational coordination’ (2018, 71).
12.4.6 The Politics of Global Funding
This can also result in fragmentation and can set the logic(s) of programming along mul-
tiple specific pathways. In Sub-Saharan Africa especially, the dominance in a number of 
countries of social protection for ‘grannies and orphans’ owes much to the availability of 
funding for responding to the HIV/AIDS pandemic and a subsequent growth of support to 
skipped-generation households. Evidence on the differential impacts of the HIV/AIDS pan-
demic were also critical. Gaps in coverage can reflect a lack of knowledge or capacity to deal 
with complexity. UNICEF (2008, 19) suggests that the nature of vulnerability as complex and 
multi-faceted results in fragmented programming with both governments and donors favour-
ing funding social protection for one specific group over others (e.g. retrenched civil servants, 
orphans and vulnerable children), hindering efforts to build systems.
12.5 FROM FRAGMENTATION TO HARMONIZATION: WHAT 
CAN BE DONE?
Addressing both the root causes and the symptoms of fragmentation, and making all ele-
ments of policy and design, and institutional arrangements and delivery more harmonized 
across social transfer programmes can result in more effective social protection systems. In 
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this section some existing experiences are presented, structured around whether they focus 
on harmonization of (1) policy and legal frameworks for social protection; (2) institutional 
arrangements and coordination mechanisms; and (3) programme delivery.
12.5.1 Strategies, Policies and Legal Frameworks
At a strategic level, policies, laws and frameworks are a key foundation for harmonization 
of social transfers. Articulating a clear approach to social protection and transfers is key. 
Countries that have anchored their social transfers within the social protection floor or that 
have recognized the importance of social transfer provision across the lifecycle are able to 
better identify and tackle gaps in coverage (UNECLAC 2015). An example is Bangladesh 
which has shifted from a ‘poor relief’ approach to a more comprehensive lifecycle approach 
which recognizes that individuals face different risks and vulnerabilities at different stages in 
life, and seeks to design social transfers to address risks at each stage. ‘Integrating different 
programs in one overall system can help to expose gaps in coverage over the life cycle’ 
(UN DESA 2018a). In Myanmar, there is a progression towards establishing a clear policy 
framework for social transfers. In 2016, the government began to implement a National Social 
Protection Strategy Plan that sought to address social assistance ‘for the majority of the pop-
ulation outside the formal sector for the first time in a systematic manner, moving beyond the 
few fragmented social transfers in place earlier’ (Koehler and Rabi 2017, 367).
Policy frameworks are also critical for achieving efficiency gains that in turn underpin 
equity gains. In 2013, the World Bank noted that commitments to address targeting and 
leakage errors in programmes might not be shared by all government practitioners in the 12 
ministries that implemented Bangladesh’s largest safety net programme. The development 
of the National Social Protection Strategy was used as a key mitigating measure to ensure 
a coordinated response to targeting and leakage by creating greater awareness and common 
understanding across agencies (World Bank 2013).
Articulating a policy framework only takes us so far. Anchoring social protection in national 
laws is also important and can further encourage the consolidation of multiple schemes into 
a single, more coherent framework. Examples from Africa are assessed in UNDP (2019), for 
example. UN DESA (2018a) also notes the importance of a clear legal framework in fostering 
efficient administration systems, notably where this helps to establish clear lines of responsi-
bility and mechanisms for coordination. Legal frameworks can also take us some of the way 
towards equity by enshrining rights to social protection. However, in practice, this might not 
always apply to access to social transfers because laws are rarely explicit about the precise 
instrument of social protection and may comply with the law using other types of instruments, 
particularly contributory programmes. One notable exception is India where the Mahatma 
Gandhi National Employment Guarantee Act 42 of 2005 provides transfers, in return for 
labour, for 100 days each year. Provision under the Act is a key step to rationalizing India’s 
overabundance of transfer projects.
12.5.2 Strengthening Coordination and Institutional Arrangements
At the heart of the harmonization project is institutional coordination and capacity. Social pro-
tection policy frameworks often cut across multiple sectors and operationalizing them across 
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multiple sectors highlights the importance of coordination and social transfer programmes 
having clear institutional homes (European Commission 2015d, in UN DESA 2018a).
In a number of countries, the establishment of a social protection or social transfer policy 
framework – coordinated from a lead ministry but including all those delivering social 
transfers – is important. In Brazil the Ministry of Social Development was created in 2004 
to integrate a range of non-contributory social protection policies for the poor and vulnera-
ble, notably social assistance, conditional cash transfers and transfers for food and nutrition 
security (Ministry of Social Development 2013). The establishment of a single ministry or 
agency ‘brings a mandate, a budget, clearly defined roles and responsibilities and capacities to 
implement’ (UNDP 2019, 41), but there are other institutional mechanisms to support harmo-
nization including semi-autonomous agencies (South Africa), public bodies under ministries 
(Kenya) and private management consultancies (Uganda).
For equity – particularly having appropriate social transfer designs for the specific needs 
of vulnerable groups – it is unwise to automatically assume that a single ministry housing all 
social transfer programmes is appropriate but it certainly makes a difference when a single 
ministry is charged with managing coordination. In practice, even under a harmonized system, 
involvement in social transfers is likely and necessary across a number of ministries. As UN 
DESA (2018b) notes, ‘effectively addressing the needs of individuals who face overlapping 
disadvantages – such as young migrants, older persons with disabilities or indigenous women 
– may require programmes that draw on a range of expertise across ministries and other 
institutions’.
In the case of institutional capacity, international agencies are both part of the problem 
and potentially part of the solution. International agencies can also have a deleterious impact 
on harmonization. Developing a consistent approach to institutional strengthening for social 
protection within and between financial organizations (such as the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund), development organizations (such as the United States Agency 
for International Development, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) 
and UNICEF) and national governments would be a major contribution to the lessons offered 
by current social protection systems. There are significant efforts underway for international 
agencies to work more effectively together. One such route is a ‘Three Ones’ approach – one 
national plan, one oversight body, one monitoring and evaluation system. Another is the 
Social Protection Inter-Agency Cooperation Board process, established in 2012 at the behest 
of the G20 Development Working Group to convene international and bilateral development 
partners to better coordinate their policy, advocacy, programming and financial resources in 
support of nationally owned social protection.
12.5.3 Improving the ‘Plumbing’
In terms of the efficiency dimension in Figure 12.1, getting delivery systems working effec-
tively is the most important thing. As Asher and Vora (2018) argue, improving social protec-
tion’s ‘plumbing’ can lead to better expenditure management and targeting, and by extension 
to improved outcomes from a given level of expenditure. Other features of social transfer 
systems that can make substantial contributions to harmonization are described in more detail, 
including the ‘nuts and bolts’ of payment systems, single registries, grievance/accountability 
systems, in Chapters 10, 24, 26, 28 and 33.
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The dominant approach for improving the plumbing is the establishment of social protection 
information systems (Barca 2017). Efficiency benefits include more streamlined reporting and 
oversight, the identification and avoidance of duplication and achieving economies of scale 
in targeting, verification and payment systems. Consolidated information systems can also 
contribute to greater equity, with greater responsiveness and inclusiveness of interventions 
and improved transparency and accountability. However, establishing consolidated informa-
tion systems faces a paradox or catch-22: the very requirements for establishing information 
systems are precisely those that are lacking in fledgling and fragmented systems. Information 
systems have high costs and complexities (at least initially), and require high levels of capac-
ity, policy leadership and institutional coordination (Barca 2017).
Another approach to harmonizing is to maximize the benefits of pilot programmes. Social 
transfer pilots are frequently presented as the pantomime villains of social transfers, the poster 
child for fragmentation. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s 
Development Centre (OECD-DEV 2019, 32) notes that although pilots are part of the problem 
because they ‘pose risks of system fragmentation’, they can also be part of the solution by bring-
ing opportunities for productive innovation in social transfers. Drawing on Infante-Villarroel 
(2016) and Mukherjee et al. (2018), it outlines the mixed results of donor-led pilots:
Starting in 2013, UNICEF supported the implementation of a pilot cash transfer to impoverished 
pregnant women and children up to the age of five along with behaviour change communication to 
improve feeding and WASH [water, sanitation and hygiene] practices. The World Bank implemented 
a near-identical pilot starting in 2014. The duplication represented a less efficient use of aid resources, 
indicative of the challenge aid fragmentation in Cambodia represents. However, both pilots focused 
on evidence-building and the resulting corroboration of the independent impact evaluations along 
with coordinated policy advocacy from the two development partners has led to the implementation 
of a national cash transfer programme for pregnant women and children.
The lesson is that, if pilots are to contribute to harmonization rather than fragmentation, it is 
important to only use them where they make significant contributions to the development of 
a more efficient and/or equitable effective system of social transfers and where they are coor-
dinated among donors and government.
Another strategy for achieving buy-in for harmonization, albeit one that is fiercely con-
tested, is results-based funding. In Kenya (Republic of Kenya 2017), five social assistance 
programmes are being harmonized across two ministries, with harmonization efforts tied 
to a Program-for-Results lending instrument. A USD250 million loan was provided to the 
Government of Kenya subject to disbursement-linked indicators including the creation and 
functioning of grievance mechanisms, as well as streamlining of management information 
systems and targeting, and progress with a single registry, electronic payments, the timing of 
payments and wider consolidation of social assistance programmes.
Beyond results-based financing, other shifts in financing systems can yield benefits for 
harmonized social transfers. Harris (2013) and Garcia and Moore (2012) assess financing 
systems in Ethiopia finding that, although the government still operates through annual 
budgets, international agencies are programming with longer time frames and this supports the 
use of a medium-term expenditure and financing framework for planning purposes. Instead 
of unscheduled/spontaneous and separate donor contributions to different programmes in 
different ministries and departments, working through medium-term expenditure and financ-
ing frameworks brings together donor contributions and allows timely planning. This in turn 
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provides an entry point for better assessment and filling of programming coverage gaps and 
for shared administrative systems.
Further down the chain, fragmentation and lack of coherence are problems for beneficiaries 
(or non-beneficiaries) at the local level so robust grievance mechanisms are crucial to ensure 
that the rights of beneficiaries are respected. ‘Making social protection programmes more 
inclusive requires transparent official avenues for people to challenge their exclusion or 
denounce discrimination and corruption’ (UN DESA 2018b, xxiii). This is central to address-
ing gaps in cover that are a symptom of exclusion.
12.6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
None of these barriers [to harmonization] are insurmountable. The design and implementation of poli-
cies can either keep social protection out of reach for some or, alternatively, give those left behind the 
opportunity to benefit from them. Whether or not they result in greater social inclusion depends on the 
specific measures in place and the way in which they are implemented. (UN DESA 2018a, xxi)
This chapter has identified multiple ways in which harmonization can contribute to the effec-
tiveness of social assistance by achieving efficiency and equity outcomes. Although there are 
paradoxes that challenge progress, a number of recommendations follow from the UN DESA 
assertion that many of the obstacles to overcoming fragmentation are not insurmountable.
First, it is important to view harmonization as something to be realized progressively by 
ensuring that social transfers are kept relatively simple in the first instance and delivered 
effectively (on time, reliably and at meaningful levels), and then incorporate more complex 
design features over time.
Second, recognizing that fragmentation is as much a political feature as a technical one 
is key. The use of procedural working groups of multiple stakeholders can go some way to 
ensuring that the needs of vulnerable groups and the capacities of systems, and not political 
expediency, drive the transition to more harmonized social transfers.
Third, policy-makers and practitioners need to acknowledge trade-offs, for example the fact 
that achieving improvements in coverage is not easily achieved alongside delivering higher 
transfer levels that can make a meaningful difference to people’s lives.
Fourth, it is important to also recognize that too few programmes can create inequities. In 
countries where a single programme dominates the social transfer landscape (the Productive 
Safety Net Programme in Ethiopia, the Benazir Income Support Programme in Pakistan and 
the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Programme in the Philippines), the possibilities for meeting 
varied needs and addressing specific vulnerabilities can be crowded out. The implication is 
that harmonization efforts that reduce the number of different social transfer programmes too 
far may create a new problem.
Fifth, we should beware blanket disapproval of ways of working such as allowing social 
transfers to be delivered by a number of ministries, the engagement of non-government actors 
and using social transfer pilots. While there are examples of each of these ways of working 
contributing to fragmentation, that is not always nor automatically the case. Instead, assessing 
how far delivering in these ways provides opportunities to leverage efficiency and equity gains 
without contributing to further fragmentation is key.
Finally, it is important to ensure that national governments’ priorities are put first, ahead of 
the institutional mandates, priorities and off-the-shelf instruments of international agencies.
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There is much to do and, if anything, these challenges, and the imperative to harmonize, 
are growing. The increasing threat of the climate emergency and growing numbers of house-
holds displaced by conflict and other crises create new types of vulnerability and increasing 
caseloads for social transfers. In the case of internally displaced persons and refugees, social 
transfers are patchy and inconsistently applied by governments and international agencies (UN 
DESA 2018a). At the time of writing, the COVID-19 pandemic is also creating new sources 
of vulnerability in low- and middle-income countries. Households are exposed not just to the 
morbidity and mortality impacts of the virus but also to negative impacts that public health 
measures designed to reduce the risk of contagion (such as social distancing and curfews) 
have for livelihoods and household income. Governments and their developing partners are 
increasingly pivoting social transfer programming – that is notably skewed to rural locations in 
low-income countries – to urban contexts. Tackling these additional challenges in a coherent 
way requires programming solutions that are harmonized yet appropriately tailored for spe-
cific contexts to ensure equity. In practice that means harmonized systems for targeting and 
setting payment levels but not automatically using the same targeting criteria and paying the 
same benefit level for everyone, everywhere.
It also reinforces the fact that tackling the major global development challenges will need 
harmonization without, too, so not just between social transfers and other elements of social 
protection, but much more broadly with other sectors such as health, education and agriculture 
(see also the other chapters in Part III). UN DESA (2018a, 1) suggests that ‘deprivations rein-
force one another… unequal access to health, education and social protection systems feeds 
a vicious cycle of disadvantage and exclusion’.
Furthermore, as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW 2018, 274) notes, coherence requires the mutual reinforcement of interna-
tional agendas on disaster risk reduction and climate change adaption with agendas on gender 
equality, rights to education and information, work and social protection, health and freedom 
of movement. While social transfers are a small part of these wide and complex agendas, they 
are an essential part of the ‘plumbing’, so getting them right is crucial to achieving these wider 
global goals.
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